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Options for Local School Districts Reviewing Local
Governance and Moral Issues Raised by the Equal
Access Act: The Gay-Straight Student Alliance in
Utah
Matthew Hilton, J.D., Ph.D. 1

On February 20, 1996, an outspoken student speaker
seeking approval of an extracurricular student club for gay,
lesbian, bisexual students and their supporting homosexual friends
informed school board members of the Salt Lake City School
District that the questions involved were neither moral nor
religious; they were legal. For other speakers, the legal issues did
not focus on another unfunded, federal mandate; rather,
reminiscent of the federal protections afforded civil rights in public
education in the 1950's and the 1960's, laws like the Equal Access
Act were needed to ensure equal treatment of
student
perspectives regarding private sexual matters. Like in the
Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial campaign of 1858 when neither Lincoln
nor Douglas could find a common moral, legal or constitutional
ground to debate public policies associated with the expansion of
slavery in their day, those speaking to the local school board that
night were unable to find common ground in law, morality, or
political rationale to define or act on the challenging, practical
decisions confronting the local school board.
In light of this modern-day confusion, perhaps a return to
Abraham Lincoln's counsel to his fellow citizens seeking to limit
the expansion of slavery on moral and legal grounds would be
relevant today: "If we could first know where we are, and whither
we are tending, we could then better judge what to do, and how to
do it."2 Like the irreconcilable differences evident in the debates
of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas over the expansion of

1. Matthew Hilton, of Springville, Utah, is a practicing civil rights attorney and
educational consultant, holding four degrees from Brigham Young University
including a master's degree in history, a Juris Doctorate in law, and a Ph.D. in
education. This article reflects solely his personal views and not necessarily those of
any client or employer.
2. Abraham Lincoln, "House Divided" Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 16,
1858, in LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher,
(Vintage Books: The Library of America)(1992) at 131 (emphasis added).
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slavery, it seems that the political and legal choices that are made
when confronted with a request for student sponsored clubs
focusing on sexual matters may well begin and end with one's
perception of the nature of man and morality. This article will
briefly review the background of the Equal Access Act (EAA), the
history of the challenging, unsolicited problems that were
presented to an unwilling Salt Lake City School Board, the impact
of the Equal Access Act on a state's fundamental definition of its
educational mission, and an option under the Equal Access Act
that could be chosen by a local school board that would prevent
recognition of a student extracurricular club focusing on sexual
matters without having to ban all other non-curricular clubs.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Seeking understanding of the complex factual and legal
background confronting the Salt Lake City school board requires
an awareness of the background of the federal EAA legislation
that appeared to mandate the decision-making framework of the
local board, and the factual background of the controversy
confronting the local school board.
A. The Legal Background of EAA

When Congress adopted the EAA by lopsided majorities in
both the United States Senate and House, its sponsors were
confident that it would override at least two circuit court decisions 3
and practices of many local school districts that seemed to prevent
or discourage student-initiated groups of secondary education
students from meeting to discuss religious matters outside of
classes on school grounds. Six years after the adoption of the EAA,
in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66)
v. Mergens 4 ("Mergens"), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the EAA was adopted precisely for that reason.
We think it significant, however, that the Act, which was passed
by wide, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate,
reflects at least some consensus on a broad legislative purpose.
The Committee Reports indicate that the Act was intended to
address perceived widespread discrimination against religious
speech in public schools, ... and, as the language of the Act

3. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1042-1048 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1155-1156 (1983); Brandon v.
Guilderland Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1123
(1982).
4. 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990).
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indicates, its sponsors contemplated that the Act would do more
than merely validate the status quo. The Committee Reports also
show that the Act was enacted in part in response to two federal
appellate court decisions holding that student religious groups
could not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, meet on
school premises during noninstructional time. . . . A broad
reading of the Act would be consistent with the views of those
who sought to end discrimination by allowing students to meet
and discuss religion before and after classes. 5

Under the EAA, all secondary schools that receive federal funds,
and, which by practice or formal policy, allow student clubs to be
organized (that are student-initiated and are not directly related
to the curriculum) 6 must treat all student clubs the same
"regardless of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of their speech at such meetings." 7
Notwithstanding this significant federal mandate, the
majority of the Court in Mergens stated:
[W] e think schools and school districts nevertheless retain a
significant measure of authority over the type of officially
recognized activities in which their students participate. See, e.g.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). First, schools
and school districts maintain their traditional latitude to
determine appropriate subjects of instruction. To the extent that
a school chooses to structure its offerings and existing student
groups to avoid the Act's obligations, that result is not prohibited
by the Act.... Second, the Act expressly does not limit a school's
authority to prohibit meetings that would "materially and
substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational
activities within the school."§ 4071(c)(4); cf. Tinher u. Des Moines
Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) .... The Act
also preserves "the authority of the school, its agents or
employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises,
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure
that attendance of students at meetings is voluntary."§ 4071(£). 8

The text and legislative history of the Act is ambiguous on several
key points, reflective of the rushed tactics used to adopt legislation
in Congress. This ambiguous statutory language and cryptic,
conflicting history of the EAA, its apparent tacit adoption of
limited open forums through uninformed practices of local school

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1995); Id. at 226, 235-243, 246.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1995).
496 U.S., at 240-41.
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districts, 9 and the inherent conflicts and tensions raised by
overlapping legal pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Mergens, were all brought into sharp focus in Utah by several East
High School students in the Salt Lake City School District who
requested recognition of a student-sponsored club called a "GayStraight Student Alliance." 10
B. The Factual Background of the East High Controversy

In late 1995, several East High School students petitioned
their principal for permission to form a "Gay-Straight Student
Alliance" (hereinafter "Alliance"). The petition read as follows:
We, the undersigned students of East High School, feel it
necessary to form a club for gay, lesbian, and bisexual students,
and their supporting heterosexual friends. The purpose of the
club would be to increase awareness about homosexuality in high
schools, to decrease homophobia, and to help gay, lesbian, and
bisexual students feel safe and welcome in their school
environment. We request permission to use a classroom for our
meetings, and a faculty sponsor to assist during the meetings.
We do not request the use of announcement time, nor do we
request the use ofthe hallways for flier announcements. We feel
doing so would attract unwanted attention. We are extremely
concerned for the safety and well being of our members.
We are supported by many students, faculty, and parents, as well
as several Utah organizations. The undersigned as well as many
other students have been meeting unofficially off campus for
nearly a month. The attendance at these meetings is about
twenty people per meeting. We feel that ou[r] numbers are not

9. At the Feb. 20, 1996 hearing of the Salt Lake City School District, it appeared
from comments of board members that perhaps basic decisions of educational
philosophy regarding student clubs (curricular or non-curricular) had not been
previously addressed. Allowing educational philosophy and policy to be set by de facto
practice rather than de jure policy may mean many things. For example, maybe local
school board counsel had previously failed to bring the existence of the 1984 Equal
Access Law or Mergens decision to the attention of the then sitting school board
members. Second, perhaps administrators had not brought any matters involving
student clubs or organization to the attention oftheir school board because many were
not publicly endorsed by the school. Third, it is possible that a school board could
have determined that it was politically easier to let the district's de facto policies
(established by their practices) evolve over time than to comprehensively address the
educational, legal and moral ramifications of such decisions. Any of the three could
contribute to the determination of issues raised in this article by de facto practices
rather than by addressing the same publicly as a matter of law.
10. The inquiry from the State Office of Education to the Utah Attorney General
referred to the requested club as the "Gays, Lesbians, Bisexual Club." Speakers at the
Feb. 20, 1996 school board meeting and other newspaper accounts since then have
referred to the club as the "Gay-Straight Student Alliance."
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significant enough to form a club.
Our meetings would be a time for discussion of topics deemed
appropriate by the faculty advisor, and the students in
attendance. We may also invite guest speakers. In addition, we
will announce during our meetings the events and activities in
which we will be participating.
As an official club, we will plan a community service project. We
will be volunteering for the Utah AIDS Foundation and the Utah
Stonewall Center. We feel that by doing a monthly community
service project, we will help our community, in general, to feel
more comfortable with our club.
All students and faculty members are welcome at meetings and
are invited to participate in the discussion. There will be no
discrimination against anyone for any reason, be it race, age, or
sexual orientation. We feel quite confident that our diverse
school would readily welcome a club that is against
discrimination. 11
Salt Lake City School District Superintendent Darlene Robles, in
accordance with applicable state law/ 2 requested that State
Superintendent Scott Bean obtain an opinion from the Utah
Attorney General regarding basic questions arising from the
student application as well as the parameters of the EAA. After
following accepted procedures, and providing relevant background
information/ 3 on November 3, 1995 Superintendent Bean asked
Utah Attorney General Jan Graham to respond to the following
questions:
1. If a public school permits its students to form traditional clubs
such as the Ski Club, Key Club, and other clubs not directly
relating to the curriculum, must it then permit the formation of
controversial student clubs such as that which is the subject of
the current East High School petition?
If the answer to the proceeding question is "yes," please also

11. The author received a copy of this statement during the Feb. 20, 1996 school
board meeting. Thereafter, East High staff in the principal's office confirmed it had
been submitted by the students to the school administration.
12. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-1-303(3) and (4) (1953 as amended).
13. Superintendent Bean noted that "[t]he principal has received a petition from
several students for establishment of such a club. The principal has also received a
number of individual letters from persons in the community urging authorization of
the club. District officials expressed concerns that none of those who have written to
date [Nov. 3, 1995] have children in East High School and that there may be an
attempt by outside interests to manipulate this issue."
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respond to the following:
2. May school officials prohibit discussions or activities in
student clubs which, while lawful for adults, are unlawful or
otherwise restricted, e.g. restrictions under Sections 53A-13-101,
76-7-322, and 76-7 -323?
3. To what extent may schools restrict outside speakers,
advocates, and visitors, and may those restrictions, if permissible,
be different for controversial clubs than for traditional clubs?
4. To what extent may schools restrict student participation in a
club; e.g. if a club is examining controversial issues, may
membership or attendance be limited to students whose parents
have given prior approval for their children's involvement?
5. May a school treat student clubs differently in matters such as
announcements over the public address system, or in the student
newspaper, posting club notices, distributing club flyers,
references in the school yearbook or other official publications, or
membership recruitment? 14

On December 22, 1995, the Attorney General's Office responded to
these questions with effectively one sentence: "We agree with your
interpretation of the federal statute and the Mergens decision that
high school clubs must be treated equally regardless of their
controversial status or lose federal funds." 15
Against this backdrop, on February 20, 1996, Salt Lake City
School Board members stated that, according to their counsel,
there were two options the school board could follow in responding
to the student request to form the Alliance. Without abandoning
the district's desire "to promote and advance curriculum-related
student clubs that enrich the education and lives of students," 16
the board's debate and public hearing was focused on two (and only
two) choices. Under "Option 1," the board could "allow students

14. Letter from Scott W. Bean, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, to Jan
Graham, Utah State Attorney General (Nov. 3, 1995).
15. Letter from William T. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Chief, Education
Division, to Scott Bean, State Superintendent of Public Instruction (Dec. 22, 1995).
It is not clear on what legal theory the Attorney General's Office based its conclusion
that a cut-off of federal funds could be imminent when the EAA specifically provides
the following: "Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial
assistance to any school." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(e) (1995).
16. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, Agenda for Public Hearing, Feb. 20,
1996.
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opportunities to form and organize student groups that are not
related to school curriculum" with certain potential, undefined
restrictions. Under "Option 2," the board could choose to "not
allow or permit student groups or organizations not directly
related to the curriculum to organize or meet on school property." 17
The board insisted that the EAA limited their selection to the
permissive Option 1 or the restrictive Option 2. 18 The board
members then voted four to three to ban non-curriculum student
groups or organizations after the beginning of the 1996-97 school
year.

II. CONTINUING TO ENCOURAGE MORALLY BASED CIVIC VIRTUE IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION

Notwithstanding protests by local school board members
regarding federal interference with local school district authority,
it appears that allowing local school districts to define and
emphasize morally based civic virtue in public education could well
be unaffected by the EAA. In Utah, state legislation appears to
direct that a morally based public education be provided in at least
two ways. First, on a public level, various state laws require the
teaching of various civic virtues from a morally based perspective.
Second, on a private level, parental autonomy and family privacy
in religious, sexual and other moral matters are statutorily
protected. It appears that the EAA does not interfere with the
first objective, but may, depending on which legal authority is used
to interpret the EAA, interfere with the second. Understanding
the application of these state laws to activities and curricula in
public schools in the State of Utah is important for at least two
reasons.
First, it is important to understand what legal
constraints define the role and mission of public education in the
state. Second, it is important to understand which, if any, of these
state-mandated directives could be understood as conflicting with

17. Id. Unless the prohibition was restricted to "meet[ing] on school property"
during school hours, it appears that the "restriction to meet on school property" may,
if responsible adults or other entities were involved, constitute a violation of the Utah
statutory law creating an open public forum on schools after hours. See UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 53A-3-413 and 414 (1953 as amended).
18. The board not only banned the non-curricular clubs in the fall of 1996, but also
determined to take action and express their views to federal legislators from Utah and
other school districts in the State. At least one board member felt that the fear
expressed by Justice Stevens, in his Mergens dissent, was coming to pass: "If a high
school administration continues to believe it is sound public policy to exclude
controversial groups, such as political clubs, the Ku Klux Klan, and perhaps gay rights
advocacy groups, from its facilities, it must now also close its doors to traditional
extracurricular activities that are noncontroversial but not directly related to any
course being offered at the school." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting.)
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the language or intent of the EAA, and therefore, be pre-empted or
overridden by the same under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 19
A. Teaching Morally Based Civic Virtues in the Public Schools
Like many states, Utah requires that students be taught
certain values and virtues in public school. 20 Utah law requires
these virtues to be taught in connection with regular schoolwork
and presumes teachers will promote such conduct. Apparently,
this requirement to teach and role model a morally based civic
virtue is not preempted by any EAA provisions.

1. Basic State Law Requirements
Under Utah state law, "[H]onesty, temperance, morality,
courtesy, obedience to law, ... respect for parents and the home,
... and other skills, habits, and qualities of character which will
promote an upright and desirable citizenry and better prepare
students for a richer, happier life ... [must be] ... taught in
connection with regular school work." 21 A 1978 Attorney General
Opinion addressing an earlier but similar version of the mandate
to teach morality and obedience to law in the school interpreted
the legislation broadly.
That same opm10n advised former State School
Superintendent Walter D. Talbot that the statutory reference to

19. The Supremacy Clause provides the following: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
(U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.) "In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an
intent to preempt [state law], we infer such intent where ... the state law at issue
conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both ... or
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
congressional objectives." Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. Kansas Corp. Co., 489 U.S. 493,
509 (1989).
20. For example, twenty-five states mandate by statute or constitutional
provision that their public schools teach or promote morality. See ARK. CONST. art.
14, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-18-501; CAL. CONST. art. IX,§ 1; CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 44806;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 27-12, 27-15; IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; IND. CODE ANN.§ 2010.1-4-4; IOWA CONST. art. 9, 2nd§ 3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 158.190; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 1221; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 5, § 2; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 2;
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 126.03; NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-214; N.Y.
EDUC. LAw§ 801; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.D. CONST. art.
VIII,§§ 1, 3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.601; OR. REV. STAT. § 336.067; R.I. CONST.
art. XII,§ 1; S.C. CODE ANN.§ 59-29-10; S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 1; S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN.§ 13-33-6; VT. CONST. ch. II,§ 68; VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-208; W.VA. CONST. art.
12, § 12; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.01.
21. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-101(4) (1953 as amended).
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"morality'' could include the teaching of chastity within the context
of other civic virtues:
Section 53-14-10 specifically requires the teaching of those
qualities which will prepare "our youth for a richer, happier life."
There are manifold problems and difficulties arising from
unchastity which would have a negative impact with respect to
the promotion of a richer, happier life for our youth. Certainly
anyone who has dealt with young people is aware of the problems
of guilt, unwanted pregnancies, abortion, adoption, and venereal
disease.
Because the law mandates the teaching of morality, which
necessarily includes sexual morality, and mandates the obedience
to law, including those laws relating to the aforementioned sexual
offenses together with the laws prohibiting such things as
lewdness, sodomy, obscenity, and contributing to the delinquency
of a minor; and mandates teaching which will prepare youth for
a richer, happier life, it is my opinion that it is clearly appropriate
that the public schools should teach chastity to their students.
Certainly nothing should be done or condoned by teachers or
administrators which would teach, promote, or condone
immorality or unchastity.... Where Section 53-14-10 [now § 53A13-101(4)] requires the teaching of honesty, morality, courtesy
and obedience to law it is proper and appropriate that the content
and applicability of various laws be discussed with the students
with the objective of encouraging the students' obedience to these
laws. . . . This decision and many others indicate that a code of
moral conduct is often expressed through elected representatives
in the enactment of statutes and ordinances. 22

There is a long-recognized relationship between moral judgments
and statutory law. Legislatively defined, "criminal punishment
usually represents the moral condemnation of the community."23
Legislatures "are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people." 24 Thus, Utah's
requirement to teach morality and obedience to law can be
understood to mean, at a minimum, encouraging adherence to the
moral judgment expressed by the state's criminal code.

22. Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen. Thomas Anderson to Superintendent Talbot (Nov.
14, 1978).
23. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985), citing United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
24. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 253, 175 (1976) (citation omitted).
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2. Effective Teaching of Morally Based Civic Virtue is Not
Undermined by Academic Freedom, Student Speech, or Teacher
Private Conduct
Local school districts are charged with implementing the
state mandate to teach morally based civic virtue by providing "the
setting and opportunities to teach [these values] by example and
role modeling."25 As applied to private sexual matters of students
or their teachers, acts of fornication, adultery, and sodomy
remain criminal acts in Utah. 26 The power to regulate student and
teacher conduct to ensure that the foundation of a school's
educational mission to teach morality and obedience to law has
long been recognized in state and federal court decisions.

a. Regulating Speech and Conduct in the Classroom
Claims of academic freedom by teachers and freedom of
speech rights by students do not require the school to undermine
its fundamental mission ofteaching morality and obedience to law.
In curricula or other classroom matters,
[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its 'basic educational mission.' . . . even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
... [T]he school is entitled to 'disassociate itself from the speech
in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity
is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education. 27

Because the Tenth Circuit has found that a teacher's speech rights
are similar to those ofstudents, 28 and Utah law allows local school
districts and public schools to participate in defining their own
educational mission within the framework of state law, 29 a school
district could limit teacher and student speech and conduct by
choosing not to give its official imprimatur to that which
significantly and materially undermines the schools' presentation
of civic virtue and morals within the constraints of existing state
criminal law and statutory protections of parental autonomy and

25. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-701-4 A; C (1995).
26. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 76-7-103, 76-7-104, 76-5-403 (1953 as amended).
27. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1988) (citations
omitted.) Denial of student speech inconsistent with a school's "basic educational
mission" is allowed under precedent interpreting Hazelwood. See Chandler v.
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
28. See footnote 37, infra.
29. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-1A-101(8), (12) (1953 as amended).
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family privacy.
The general principle that teachers do not have academic
freedom 30 in the traditional sense31 was reaffirmed in two recent
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases. In Roberts u. Madigan, 32 a
fifth-grade school teacher challenged the school principal's decision
to remove two "Christian" books from his classroom and to prohibit
him from reading his personal Bible during class free reading time.
The school principal was motivated by a desire to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation as well as by the pedagogical
concern that the teacher "be actively involved in teaching
children." Ultimately, the federal appellate court upheld the right
ofthe local school to disassociate itself from Establishment clause
violations and prevent teacher speech for that reason as well as
other motivations "reasonably related to legitimate academic
concerns."33
Subsequently, in Miles u. Denver Public Schools, 34 a teacher
vocalized derogatory, personal feelings about a school tennis team
member's amorous public conduct. The principal disciplined the
teacher for making the statement. The appellate court upheld the
lower court's summary judgment in favor of the school district.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that a "public forum is not created by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse." 35 Apparently, the express provisions of state law
requiring the teaching of morality and obedience to law in all

30. Other federal court decisions addressing secondary school academic freedom
issues include Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1994) cert.
denied 115 S.Ct. 2460 (1995), Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. ofEduc., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176
(3rd Cir.1990), Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1307 (7th
Cir.1980), and Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 397 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D.
Mich. 1974, three judge opinion), affirmed 419 U.S. 1081 (1974). In Utah, under the
statutory provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101 (1953 as amended) and
implementing administrative rules, it appears teachers or volunteers retain a right
to speak ofthe theistic, agnostic or atheistic assumptions of cultural heritage, societal
values, political theory or moral theory that are relevant to the curricula.
31. The U. S. Supreme Court found efforts to impose "academic freedom" by
mandating the teaching of scientific evidence favoring a theory of creationism when
also teaching about the theory of evolution to be unconstitutional on establishment
clause grounds. In that setting since "in the state of Louisiana, courses in public
schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are not free,
absent permission, to teach courses different from what is required ... '[a]cademic
freedom,' at least as that phrase is commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in
this context." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 n.6 (1987).
32. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (lOth Cir. 1990).
33. ld. at 1057.
34. 944 F.2d 773 (lOth Cir. 1991).
35. ld. at 776.

12

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1996

aspects of school class work 36 could prevent a local school from
creating an open forum that undermined the values and virtues
outlined in the statute. Indeed,
[a] school's interests in regulating classroom speech -- such as
"assur[ing] that participants learn whatever lessons the activity
is designed to teach" and that students are not "exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity"
(Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 570) -- are implicated
regardless of whether that speech comes from a teacher or
student. 37

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit specifically found that "case law
does not support Miles' position that a secondary school teacher
has a constitutional right to academic freedom." 38 Prohibiting
teacher or employee conduct that endorses or encourages "illegal"
or "immoral" conduct is within the prerogative of the legislature,
State Office of Education, and local school districts.
On the other hand, student speech is broadly protected
under Utah law. A student's expression ofpersonal belief"may not
be penalized" when participating in school-directed curricula or
activities, unless "the expression unreasonably interferes with
order or discipline, threatens the well-being of any person or
property, or violates a concept of civility or propriety appropriate
to a school setting."39 Similarly, during non-instructional time,
student speech rights cannot be denied unless "the conduct
unreasonably interferes with the ability of school officials to
maintain order and discipline, unreasonably endangers persons or
property, or violates concepts of civility and propriety appropriate
to a school setting."40 Without addressing whether or not the
discussion topics sought to be included by the Alliance in their
student organization would violate "concepts of civility and
propriety appropriate to a school setting,"41 it is clear that the right
36. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-13-101(4) (1953 as amended).
37. 944 F.2d at 777 (lOth Cir. 1991).
38. Id. at 779 (and cases cited therein).
39. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3(1) (1953 as amended).
40. Utah Code Ann.§ 53A-13-101.3(2) (1953 as amended). While the state rule
addresses the aspects of this statute dealing with the exercise of religious freedoms,
and specifically limits involvement of school officials, see UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-104 B,
no provision has been made in administrative rule regarding exercise of free speech
rights by students. It is assumed that the word "unreasonably" (when modified by the
apparent requirements of actual, rather than anticipated, disruption and the use of
the least restrictive means to stop the disruption, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3(3)
(1953 as amended), as applied, would conform with the requirements of Tinker v. Des
Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
41. While not addressed in this article, resolution of this issue may well have a
direct bearing on fulfilling the implied legislative intent evident when the language
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of student speech does not go so far as to require official school
recognition and endorsement of that speech. Neither a generalized
claim by teachers to academic freedom nor state protected student
speech appears to be available when either one undermines the
basic educational mission of the public schools to teach morality
and obedience to law.

b. Regulating Teacher Conduct Off Campus That Impacts Effective
Performance in the Classroom
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized a state's
interest in inquiring into school employees' private conduct to
determine the employees' fitness. In 1960, the Court reaffirmed
that "[t]here can be no doubt ofthe right of a State to investigate
the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its
schools, as this Court before now has had occasion to recognize." 42
Indeed, the Court has said:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he
shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which
they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. That school
authorities have the right and the duty to screen officials,
teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the
integrity of the schools as part of ordered society, cannot be
doubted. 43

There is "no requirement in the federal constitution that a
teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his
fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of factors.
,44

While it is understood and recognized that First
Amendment protections give teachers the right to speak out
publicly on matters that address educational concerns of public
import, this right only applies when the statements "are neither
shown nor can be presumed in any way to have either impeded the
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools

was adopted and provide an option for broadly based local district policies that
address student-to-student sexual harassment, similar to that adopted by the Salt
Lake City School District shortly after their decision to ban extra-curricular clubs for
the 1996-97 school year. See "Student to Student Sexual Harassment Policy" adopted
on March 5, 1996.
42. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
43. Adler v. Bd. ofEduc., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952).
44. Beilan v. Bd. ofEduc., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958).

14

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1996

generally." 45
While not specifically addressed in these opinions, more
recent cases on both federal and state levels have interpreted
requirements to refrain from immoral conduct as not infringing on
private First Amendment expressive activity. These prohibitions
were upheld as long as there was (1) a nexus between private
conduct deemed to be immoral, and (2) either one's teaching
performance or the administration of the school.
A leading case in this area is National Gay Task Force u.
Board of Education of City of Oklahoma. 46 The State of Oklahoma
forbade "public homosexual conduct," which was defined as
"advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting private
homosexual activity [public, non-private commission of sodomy] in
a manner than creates a substantial risk that such conduct will
come to the attention of school children or school employees," and
provided for suspension, refusal of employment and other
sanctions for public teachers that engaged in such prohibited
conduct.
When this law was subjected to a facial challenge,
homosexuality was not afforded protection as a suspect class 47
(whether status-based or conduct-based), but private advocacy by
school employees in favor of such conduct "aimed at legal and
social change," was found to be protected speech.
The First Amendment does not permit someone to be punished
for advocating [in a private capacity] illegal conduct at some
indefinite future time .... We recognize that a state has interests
in regulating the speech of teachers that differ from its interests
in regulating the speech of the general citizenry.... But a state's
interests outweigh a teacher's interests only when the expression
results in a material or substantial interference or disruption in
the normal activities of the school. This Court has held that a
teacher's First Amendment rights may be restricted only if "the
employer shows that some restriction is necessary to prevent the
disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance
by the employee. 48

In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the earlier

45. Pickeringv. Bd. ofEduc. ofTownship High Sch. Dist. No. 205,391 U.S. 563,
572-73 (1968).
46. 729 F.2d 1270 (lOth Cir. 1984), affd by an equally divided court 470 U.S. 903
(1985).
47. See also Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (lOth Cir. 1984), cited
in Jantz v. Munci, 976 F.2d 623, 630 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1992).
48. Nat'l Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d. at 1274 (citations omitted). For other
authority upholding legislative access that had no evidentiary impact on classroom
performance, see Barnett v. State of Wisconsin Ethics Bd., 817 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis.
1993).
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efforts of the district court to "save" the statute by reading into it
an unstated legislative requirement that any challenged, private
conduct of a teacher must have a demonstrable nexus to classroom
peformance.
Efforts to restrict private conduct of teachers--whether
considered "immoral" or "illegal" have been challenged in the state
and federal courts for some time. However, many courts have
found that restrictions may occur when "unfitness to teach" or
disruption of the governance of schools by reason of the conduct is
shown. An early case articulating this standard is Gaylord u.
Tacoma School District. No. 10, 49 which accepted evidence that
disclosure of homosexual tendencies and implicit practice could
"impair or reasonably be said to impair his ability to perform the
duties of an occupation in which the homosexual engages" and also
impaired "the effectiveness of the institution which employed
him." 50
As to demonstrating "unfitness to teach," several California
cases followed precedent which interpreted seven criteria used to
determine if"immoral" conduct implicates one's fitness to teach, or
impacts on one's teaching performance:
Since the term "immoral conduct" is vague and broad, whether
such conduct demonstrates unfitness to teach is measured
against seven criteria: (1) the likelihood that the conduct may
have adversely affected students or fellow teachers, (2) the degree
of such adversity anticipated, (3) the proximity or remoteness of
time of such conduct, (4) the type of teaching certificate held by
the party involved, (5) the extenuating or aggravating
circumstances, if any surrounding the conduct, (6) the likelihood
ofthe recurrence of the questioned conduct, and (7) the extent to
which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling
effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or
other teachers. 51

Under these criteria, while the issue for resolution regarding
"immorality" is ultimately one of fact and not law, the complex
legal standard that is used encourages either judicial action or
local school board inaction in this area.
Other jurisdictions have not imposed such specific
guidelines that easily allow a judge in practice to impose his or her

49. 559 P.2d 134 (Wash. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
50. Id. at 134.
51. This standard has been followed in Governing Bd. of ABC Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Haar, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 751 (Cal. App. 2d 1994), and cases cited therein; see also
Thompson v. Southwest Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 (D.C.Mo. 1980); Coupeville
Sch. Dist. No. 204 v. Vivian, 677 P.2d 192, 196-197 (Wash. App. 1984).
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personal perspectives regarding the structure, function, and
outcome of public education52 on locally elected school boards. For
example, in Pennsylvania, immorality has been interpreted as
being "a course of conduct that offends the morals of the
community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals the
teacher is supposed to foster and elevate."53 Elsewhere, an
alternate form of analysis was used to determine when conduct is
disruptive enough to warrant immediate dismissal without
warning. 54 When a teacher wrote overtly sexual letters to two
students and was suspended for engaging in immoral conduct, an
appellate court followed earlier precedent and held that the
teacher's actions were irremediable, and justified disciplinary
action without written warning.
A warning, even if effective in stopping the plaintiffs conduct
would not be effective in correcting ... damage to the students or
the damage to the reputation of the faculty, school district and
[teacher] himself.... The [teacher's] conduct has no legitimate
basis in social policy or society. No purpose would be served by
giving the [teacher] a written warning. We conclude, therefore,
that the [teacher's] conduct is irremediable. 55

Prohibited "immoral conduct" is not limited to sexual matters. It
may include theft of property, 56 possession of marijuana and
cocaine, 57 undisclosed sexual activity with a student before hiring
in a subsequent school district, 58 and lying or making false
statements to the school district regarding absences from work. 59
Thus, state and local school board efforts to ensure that a teacher's
private conduct does not prevent effective performance in teaching
morally based civic virtue or otherwise interfere with the
administration of the public schools, are supported by significant
legal precedent upholding such actions.

52. I am indebted to Professor Neil Flinders of the BYU College of Education for
promoting in his work an increased awareness of these three concepts as analytical
tools to evaluate practical challenges in education that are evident in both
jurisprudential theory and educational philosophy.
53. Horton v. Vocational Technical Sch., 630 A.2d 481 (Pa. Commw. 1993).
54. Sparta Sch. Dist. 140 v. Illinois State Bd. ofEduc., 577 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App.
5th. 1991).
55. Id. at 906 (citations omitted).
56. Cochran v. Bd. ofEduc. ofMexico Sch. Dist. N. 59, 815 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. App.
1991).
57. Dubuclet v. Home Ins. Co., 660 So.2d 67 (La. App. 4th 1995).
58. Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., Bd. ofEduc., 881 P.2d 1112
(Alaska 1994).
59. Riverview Sch. Dist. v. Riverview Educ. Ass'n, PSEA-NEA, 639 A.2d 974 (Pa.
Commw. 1994).
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3. Neither the EAA nor Supreme Court Precedent Preempts the
Goal of Morally Based Civic Virtue in Public Education
There appears to be no serious risk of federal preemption
under the Supremacy Clause on either statutory or judicial
grounds when a state or local government determines to teach
morally based civic virtue in public education. The text of the EAA
demonstrates that the Act is only applicable to non-curricular
student organizations. There are no textual requirements that
mandate application of any standards to course work or curricular
clubs. Indeed, the Mergens opinion specifically recognized that the
right to direct curriculum and extracurricular activities still
resided with school districts.
Furthermore, the restrictions on the official speech of
employees or volunteers do not infringe on the statutory provisions
of the EAA. A club afforded "equal access" and a "fair opportunity"
is not guaranteed a faculty adviser; in fact, the federal law allows
faculty to be present only in a "non-participatory capacity."60
Presently, Utah law requires teachers to teach and role model
morality and obedience to law. If the activities of a group such as
the Alliance were reasonably understood as encouraging criminal
conduct, employees or volunteers could be directed to refrain from
promoting the same in their official capacities. 61 Allowing faculty
to serve only as monitors of student conduct rather than active
advisers, 62 does not interfere with the intent or purposes of the
EAA.63
While expressed in different ways, the U.S. Supreme Court
has also repeatedly presumed that American public education's
task is to instill moral and civic values in students.
Notwithstanding the Court's inconsistent use of evidentiary
assumptions and legal standards in education-related cases, 64 as
shown hereafter, the recognition and acceptance of the role of

60. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (1995).
61. In light oflegislative directives regarding teaching morality and obedience to
law and an administrative rule of the State Office of Education to role model the
same, such a mandate could be construed as "reasonably related to legitimate
academic concerns" under Hazelwood.
62. Alliance's request presumed that the faculty adviser would be actively
involved in setting the agenda for the group's discussions.
63. The EAA specifically determined that "[t]he assignment of a teacher,
administrator or other school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not
constitute sponsorship of that meeting." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (1995). See also, Seese
v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 811 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
64. See Matthew Hilton, Recognizing Constitutional Freedoms in Public Schools:
Reasserting State and Local Educational Policy and Practice through Non-Judicial
Law, 1994 B.Y.U. Educ. and L. J. 1, 3-5.
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public schools, as an institution designed to promote and build civic
virtue, as defined by local school boards has remained constant in
significant Court opinions discussing the role of public education. 65
For example, early Court opinions assumed that student
internalization of morality was a basic objective of public education. Early in U.S. history, the Supreme Court recognized that:
[s]chools and education were regarded by the congress of the
Confederation as the most natural and obvious appliances for the
promotion of religion and morality. In the ordinance of 1787,
passed for the government of the Territory Northwest of the Ohio,
it is declared, article 3, 'Religion, morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government ... the means of education shall
forever be encouraged.'66

In 1898, the Court reaffirmed an 1881 holding that governments
could fund education by public taxation because moral training
provided by the education contributed to social stability:
Every man in a county, a town, a city or a state is deeply
interested in the education of the children of the community,

65. In cases such as Bd. ofEduc., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) where five opinions analyzed on differing grounds the
plurality's finding of a "new" liberty of access to certain books in a high school library,
eight of the nine justices disclaimed any intent to undermine local control over content
of the curriculum. The plurality opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
stated that "local school boards must be permitted to 'establish and apply their
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values' and that 'there is a
legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and
traditional values be they social, moral or political."' Id. at 864. Justice Blackman
recognized that "[b]ecause of the essential socializing function of schools, local
education officials may attempt 'to promote civic virtue."' ld. at 876. While Justice
White did not address the issue, in dissenting opinions, Justices Burger, Powell,
Rehnquist and O'Connor determined that "school authorities must have broad
discretion" to fulfill the obligation to promote "respect for authority, and traditional
values be they social, moral, or political." ld. at 889. Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice Burger and Powell, opined that "[w]hen it acts as an educator, at least at the
elementary and secondary school level, the government is engaged inculcating social
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people. Obviously, there are
numerous decisions to be made as to what courses should be taught, what books
should be purchased, or what teachers should be employed. In every one of these
areas the members of a local school board will act on the basis of their own personal
or moral values, will attempt to mirror those of the community, or will abdicate the
making of such decisions to so-called 'experts.' In this connection, I find myself
entirely in agreement with the observation of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1230, 1305 (1980), that
it is 'permissible and appropriate for local boards to make educational decisions based
upon their personal, social, political, or moral views . . . . In short, actions by
government as educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions
by government as sovereign." Id. at 909-910.
66. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 65 (1890).
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because his peace and quiet, his happiness and prosperity, are
largely dependent upon the intelligence and moral training which
it is the object of public schools to supply to the children of his
neighbors and associates, if he has none himself. 67

Court opinions in the post-World War I private education
cases, Meyer v. Nebraska 68 (hereinafter "Meyer") and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters 69 continued to operate on the assumption that
government had an interest in seeing that basic morality and civic
virtue was promoted in both public and private schools. Even
though the law prohibiting instruction in the living European
languages before the eighth grade was enacted as an effort "to
promote civic development," 70 it was declared unconstitutional
because it was an infringement on the natural rights of parents to
employ tutors and select subject matter of their own choosing.
Nonetheless,
[t]hat the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, and
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected .... [Nonetheless,] [t]he power of
the state to compel attendance at some school and to make
reasonable regulations for all schools ... is not questioned. 71

Indeed,
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the state
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare. 72

Recognition of the importance of morality and education IS
evidenced in more modern opinions as well.
In 1979, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to New
York's refusal to allow aliens to teach in the public school system:

67. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 279 (1898), citing Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S.
78, 82 (1881).
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70. 262 U.S., at 401.
71. Id. at 401-402.
72. 268 U.S., at 534.
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The curricular requirements of New York's public school system
reflect some of the ways a public school system promotes the
development of the understanding that is prerequisite to
intelligent participation in the democratic process. The schools
are required to provide instruction "to promote a spirit of
patriotic and civic service and 'obligation and to foster in the
children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are
essential in preparing to meet the obligations of citizenship in
peace or in war ... .' Flag and other patriotic exercises also are
prescribed, as loyalty is a characteristic of citizenship essential to
the preservation of a country. In addition, required courses
include classes in civics, United States and New York history, and
principles of American government.
Although private schools are bound by most of these
requirements, the State has a stronger interest in ensuring that
the schools it most directly controls, and for which it bears the
cost, are as effective as possible in teaching these courses." 73

The Court followed earlier precedent indicating that "public school
teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that goes to the
heart of representative government."' 74 It stated:
[t]he importance of public schools in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation
of the values on which our society rests, [has been] long
recognized by our decisions ...
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in
developing students' attitudes toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. . . . In shaping
the students' experience to achieve educational goals, teachers by
necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material
is communicated to students. They are responsible for presenting
and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both comprehensible and inspiring. No amount of standardization of teaching
materials or lesson plans can eliminate the personal qualities a
teacher brings to bear in achieving these goals. Further, a
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle
but important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus,
through both the presentation of course materials and the
example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the
attitudes of students towards government, the political process,

73. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78 n.8 (1979) (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 75-76.
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and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to
the continued health of a democracy ...
More importantly, a State properly may regard all teachers as
having an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding
in their classes, regardless of the subject taught. Certainly a
State also may take account of a teacher's function as an example
for students, which exists independently of particular classroom
subjects. 75
In 1982, in the case of Plyler v. Doe, 76 the Court took
occasion to comment on the importance of education in American
society. This discussion arose while examining the duty Texas had
to provide public education for children of illegal aliens. Nine
years earlier, Texas persuaded the Court that education was a
right which was not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 77 The
issue arose as to whether or not the federal government could
impose equal protection standards on Texas' refusal to educate
children of illegal aliens. In determining that the state had to
accord certain rights to the children of illegal aliens, the Court
addressed significant precedent supporting a state's right to
provide a morally based education:
The "American people have always regarded education and [the]
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400,43 S.Ct. 625, 627,67 L.Ed.
1042 (1923). We have recognized "the public schools as a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system
of government," Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 230, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1575, 10 L.Ed.2d 884 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the
values upon which our society rests." Ambach v. Norwich, 441
U.S. 68, 76, 99 S.Ct. 1589, 1594, 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979). 78
More recent opinions have clarified that public education may be
constitutionally permitted.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting
that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to
sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of
the schools." . . . The process of educating our youth for
citizenship in public schools is not confined to the books, the

75.
76.
77.
78.

ld. at 76-80.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
457 U.S., at 221.
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curriculum, and the civics class; school must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or
otherwise, teachers -- and indeed the older students -demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models .... The First
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent's would undermine the school's basic educational
mission. 79
Following similar reasoning, it stated:
[a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate
drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social order".
. . or to associate the school with any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the
schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as
"a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment." ... [W]e hold that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 80
All of the above suggest that the specific legislative directive to
teach morally based civic virtue and obedience to law may continue
to be directed under state law and identified as an integral part of
the mission of public education, without fear of preemption by the
EAA or the Supreme Court precedent outlined above. 81

B. Protecting Parental Autonomy and Family Privacy in Public
Education
Utah adopted specific legislative protections regarding
parental autonomy (as to matters of conscience) and family privacy
in public education. 82 Protecting choices based on conscience (or

79. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683-685 (1986).
80. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-273 (1988).
81. If carefully designed, conscientiously administered , and consistently applied,
these decisions need not violate the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause. See
Matthew Hilton, supra, footnote 64 at 9-11.
82. By statute, Utah law prohibits funding of instruction or encouragement of the
use of contraceptives. Like the analysis which follows regarding state law upholding
parental autonomy and family privacy, depending on the judicial authority relied
upon, this law may be preempted when applied to a non-curricular student club under
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adherence to "a superior duty which is more than personal
preference"83) or family privacy regarding sexual matters, religious
beliefs, and family relationships, allows parents to ensure that
those who "work at creating one type of moral environment at
home" are not required to have their children participate in school
curricula or activities "that teaches a different set of values." 84
Nonetheless, depending on which EAA lower court precedent one
chooses, applying these protections of conscience and family to
non-curricular related student clubs may be preempted by the
EAA.
1. Nature of Utah Law
In 1993, the Utah State Legislature unanimously passed
legislation giving broad freedom of conscience prerogatives to
parents and secondary students. The law provides that when a
parent or legal guardian "determines that the student's
participation in a portion of the curriculum or in an activity would
require the student to affirm or deny a religious belief or right of
conscience, or engage or refrain from engaging in a practice
forbidden or required in the exercise of a religious right or right of
conscience," the parent may request a waiver of the requirement
to participate or suggest a reasonable alternative. 85 State law
requires the claimed infringement "must rise to a level of belief
that the requested conduct violates a superior duty which is more
than personal preference."86 These rules state that:

the EAA The Attorney General Opinion of Dec. 22, 1995 failed to address the specific
request of State Superintendent Bean as to whether or not recognition of the Alliance
under the EAA was forbidden by the statutory prohibitions regarding provision or
encouragement of contraceptive services. "Contraceptive services" means "any
material, program, plan, or undertaking that is used for instruction on the use of birth
control devices and substances, encourages individuals to use birth control methods,
or provides birth control devices." UTAH CoDE. ANN. § 76-7 -321(2) (1953 as amended).
The definition of "funds" that are prohibited include "money, supply, material,
building, or project provided by this state or its political subdivision." UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-7-322 and 323 (1953 as amended). To the degree that the Alliance
activities were to offer instruction regarding, or encouraging the use of birth control
devices, such as condoms, it could be argued that such speech was contrary to state
law prohibiting access to a "building'' for such purposes. It is assumed that in general
such provisions would survive a facial challenge under the latitude afforded state and
local governments under Supreme Court opinions in Fraser, supra, and Hazelwood,
supra.
83. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5B (1995).
84. William Kirkpatrick, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T TELL RIGHT FROM WRONG 252
(Touchstone ed. 1993).
85. UTAH CODE. ANN.§ 53A-13-101.2(1) (1953 as amended). The law was written
so that either a parent's or student's request would trigger the ability to remove a
student on grounds on conscience.
86. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5 B (1995).
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[p]ermitting the submission of requests for participation waivers,
and the provision of reasonable alternatives, is intended to
facilitate appropriate protection and accommodation of a
requesting party's asserted right of conscience or exercise of
religious freedom, and shall not be considered an attempt by a
school official to endorse, promote, or disparage a particular
religious or non-religious viewpoint. 87

To the degree that "an activity" includes student participation in
a curricular or non-curricular club, or the "counseling" that takes
place in such a location, 88 under existing state law, parents can
request that their child not participate in the club's activities.
In 1994, the Utah State Legislature adopted the Utah
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. 89 Under this law,
unanimously reaffirmed as amended in 1995, districts must have
"policies governing the protection of family and student privacy" to
"protect the privacy of students, their parents, and their families,
and support parental involvement in the education of their
children."90 A two-week, advance written notification is required,
(waiveable by the parent)91 before a student may be involved in any
part of the "curriculum" or "other school activities" whose:
purpose or evident intended effect is to cause the student to
reveal information, whether the information is personally
identifiable or not, concerning the student's or any family
member's ... sexual behavior, orientation or attitudes; illegal,
anti-social, self-incriminating, or demeaning behavior; critical
appraisals of individual with whom the student or family member
has close family relationships; religious affiliations or beliefs 92

without having written permission from the parent. 93 Assuming
that an officially recognized student club (curricular or noncurricular) would be considered "other school activities," it appears
from the statute that students need written parental permission,
after disclosure, to be involved in school clubs.

87. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5 H (1995).
88. Counseling of students is defined by administrative rule as constituting
"instructional time." UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105 G (1995).
89. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-301, 302 (1953 as amended).
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-301 (1953 as amended).
91. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-13-302(4) (1953 as amended).
92. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-302(1),(2),(3) (1953 as amended).
93. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-13-302(1),(2),(3) (1953 as amended).
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2. Possible Preemption Under EAA

The EAA text and interpretive judicial precedent allow at
least two different ways of analyzing a preemption claim involving
the application of state laws pertaining to parental autonomy and
family privacy to student speech and involvement in non-curricular
clubs under the EAA. Possible conflicts could arise under both
laws that protect parental autonomy in matters of conscience and
those involving family privacy. While some could argue that
student speech is protected under the state's creation of a limited
public forum regarding student belief, 94 protection against
inappropriate disclosure ofbeliefs, attitudes and actions of parents
who are either unaware or unable to respond are the very
prerogatives of local school districts which were recognized in
Hazelwood. 95 Nonetheless, such law specifically regulates student
speech in non-curricular clubs that parts of the EAA seemed to
protect. Under state law allowing parents to remove their children
from a school "activity" that is offensive to the conscience of the
parent, an argument can be made that were this parental
prerogative96 to be exercised, it could, in fact, restrict the ability of
"any student" to create his own non-curriculum club within the
limited student forum available to them.
The EAA interprets "fair opportunity criteria" to require
that "the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere
with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school."97 Furthermore, nothing in the EAA was intended to "limit
the authority of the school ... to protect the well-being of students
and faculty." 98 State laws that seek to comprehensively define
public education as a public entity seeking to improve the well
being of students within a context of moral standards and parental
involvement, 99 could be significantly and materially undermined if

94. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.3 (1953 as amended). This supposition,
however, is undermined by the legislative history of the Act which specifically
incorporated reference to the Fraser opinion when defining the nature of"civility and
decorum" that should exist in student speech.
95. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The application of Hazelwood to the EAA is problematic
because the facts of Hazelwood dealt with classroom-related activities associated with
the school while the EAA presumed that the student-initiated clubs and organizations
could be disassociated from the school.
96. Without the exercise of parental prerogative, the school would not be
involved; it is presumed that the "voluntary" meeting would ensure no student would
attend who would have wanted to assert his or her own, independent right of
conscience against participating under the EAA.
97. 20 U.S. C. § 4071(c)(4) (1995).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(D (1995).
99. While not the subject of review here, academic literature has documented how
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required to give way on fundamental issues of parental exercise of
conscience, privacy and autonomy because a non-curricular student
group was allowed on campus.
Equality in application of preexisting laws was determined
to be sufficient to justify what, in practice, could result from an
intrusion of student governance of a student non-curricular club.
In Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3, 100 a religious
club objected to standardized rules applied to non-student club
officer elections because a non-Christian student could seek to
become an officer of its Bible club. A federal district court upheld
the requirement, stating,
[a]s there is no basis in the record for plaintiffs' suggestion that
the School District will not afford the [B]ible club the same
privileges afforded other noncurriculum-related clubs and allow
it to meet on the same terms and conditions as those other clubs,
the School District appears to have satisfied its obligation under
the Act of permitting religious speech and religious activities on
a nondiscriminatory basis. 101

To the degree the one-sentence legal opmwn from the Utah
Attorney General was seeking to follow this line of reasoning, state
laws involving parental autonomy and family privacy that are
equally applied to student involvement in all clubs, regardless of
the content of the student speech, are valid, and are binding on
Utah schools 102 and could, under the theory of the Hsu case, be
upheld as being in conformance with the statutory requirements
of EAA. If so, there would be no preemption concern.
Nevertheless, a contrary result regarding the role of the
EAA and preemption of fundamental state law addressing public
education could be reached if the thinking of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403 103

parental involvement in their children's education is a (if not "the") dominant factor
in the child's educational achievement. Thus, whether acting on grounds respecting
parental authority for moral or political reasons, a school could well conclude that a
students' academic "well being" would be well served by allowing or encouraging such
parental involvement.
100. 876 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
101. ld. at 456.
102. This is true for two reasons. First, the opinion of the Attorney General is
binding on all Utah schools regarding interpretation oflaw. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§
53A-1-303(3) and (4) (1953 as amended). Second, local districts are mandated and
empowered to implement the same by local policy. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13101.3 (1953 as amended) and UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-9A(1) (1995) for law regarding
parental autonomy and conscience; See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 53A-13-301, 302 (1953 as
amended) regarding privacy laws which are to be implemented on a district level.
103. 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 72-73 (1993).
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were applied in Utah. On remand/ 04 a lower district court ruled
that the EAA need not be applied because allowing student
religious meetings violated the Washington State Constitution and
the EAA did not force the local district to "sanction meetings that
are otherwise unlawful; ... or to abridge the constitutional rights
of any person." 105 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that
Congress had provided "religious student groups" a federal right
and, following the lead in Mergens, "the entire Act must be read to
effectuate a broad Congressional purpose." 106 Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit found that Congress intended to preempt all state laws
which discriminated against clubs authorized by the EAA due to
the student groups' speech content:
The Court's finding of a broad legislative purpose suggests that
Congress intended to preempt state law: "Congress clearly sought
to prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis of the content
of a student group's speech, and that obligation is the price a
federally funded school must pay if it opens its facilities to
noncurriculum related student groups." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241,
110 S.Ct. at 2367. The Act permits schools to avoid its
obligations, but only at a price. They must either reject federal
funding or close the school's limited open forum. See id. If the
EAA did not preempt state law, then states could freely opt out
of its requirements. Congress did not intend to permit the states
to thwart its objectives by outlawing speech based on its religious
content, and thereby discriminate on that basis. 107

Protection of the content of student "religious speech" could
logically be construed to include all speech because the act
protected not only religious speech but also speech of a "political,
philosophical, or other content."108 All "other content" could be
understood to include speech that violated a parent's conscience or
invaded family privacy. Thus, if the EAA provisions protecting
student speech in non-curricular clubs were read broadly, state
laws which provide protection for parental autonomy in matters of
conscience and family privacy could be preempted by the EAA.
This result, however, would depend on which legal doctrines were
used to analyze the text and application of the EAA. 109
104. A previous round of litigation, which was eventually vacated by the U.S.
Supreme Court is reported in Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D.
Wash. 1987), affd, 865 F.2d 1121, modified, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated and
remanded in light o{Mergens, 496 U.S. 914 (1990).
105. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531, 537 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
106. 987 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 72-73 (1993).
107. !d. at 646.
108. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1995).
109. Other federal laws could also be brought into the equation in an effort to

28

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1996

Thus, while it is clear that Utah's legislative mandate to
teach morally based civic virtue in the public schools would remain
intact under the EAA, other applicable laws dealing with parental
autonomy regarding matters of conscience and family privacy may
or may not be preempted by the EAA. 110
Ill.

CONTINUING TO PROTECT THE WELL-BEING OF STUDENTS
UNDER THE EAA

Based on the foregoing legal analysis, it could be presumed
that laws governing Utah's public schools presuppose that the
teaching of morally based civic virtue and encouraging parental
involvement in their children's education will in the short and longrun promote and protect the well-being of students. In Mergens,
the Court specifically recognized that the text of the EAA and
earlier precedent specifically protects efforts of school districts to
protect the well-being of their students.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the
authority of the school, its agents, or its employees, to maintain
order and discipline on the school premises, to protect the wellbeing of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of
students at meetings is voluntary. 111

Precedent interpreting Tinker has allowed local school districts to
protect high school students from student-to-student emotional
and psychological harm that can result from exposure to detailed
matters of sexuality. 112 (If such a prohibition is allowed for high

harmonize federal intent regarding parental participation in their children's
education. An example of a federal law adopted after the EAA and Mergens decision
that could have a direct impact on a pre-emption analysis would be the Restoration
of Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000bb (1995), known as "RRFA". Another issue
that could be raised and is not addressed in this article is if extracurricular school
activities are considered to be "educational activities" under the EAA, would an
attempt to have the EAA pre-empt state laws protecting parental conscience,
autonomy and family privacy as far as it related to student clubs "materially and
substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school"? See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (1995).
110. It is interesting to note that like the EAA, the Utah law regarding freedom
of conscience affords students protection in their own right. Public schools also allow
secondary students a right to seek waiver of participation based on grounds of
conscience independent of their parents. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-101.2(1) (1953 as
amended). However, in the event of a conflict between an assertion of conscience by
a parent and a minor secondary student who wanted to participate in an activity or
part of the curriculum, the parent's assertion and request for waiver (over student
desire to participate) would prevail. UTAH ADMIN. R. 277-105-5C (1995).
111. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240-241; cf Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393
u.s. 503, 509 (1969).
112. This precedent remains relevant in interpreting Supreme Court analysis for
at least three reasons. First, the contemporaneous Supreme Court denied the writ of

1]

THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT

29

school students, a fortiori, it should be allowed for seventh and
eighth graders, all considered secondary students under Utah law
and the EAA.)
In 1977, a federal appellate court was confronted with a
challenge to a school district's prohibition on student distribution
of an explicit, detailed survey regarding both homosexual and
heterosexual matters. 113 The trial judge had approved the
district's ban on distribution to ninth and tenth grade students,
but had ordered the district to allow it to be distributed to eleventh
and twelfth grade students. Overruling the district court's decision
the federal appellate court upheld the right of the school district to
prohibit distribution of the survey to all students because
of the probability that it would result in psychological harm to
some students. . . . Although psychological diagnoses of the type
involved here are by their nature difficult of precision, ... we do
not think defendants' inability to predict with certainty that a
certain number of students in all grades would be harmed should
mean that defendants are without power to protect students
against a foreseen harm. We believe that the school authorities
are sufficiently experienced in these matters, which have been
entrusted to them by the community; a federal court ought not
impose its own views in such matters where there is a rational
basis for the decisions and actions of school authorities. 114

The rationale supporting the prohibition allowed the local school
district to determine which testimony among many conflicting
"experts" was most applicable for their district and that the
anticipated harm need not impact all students or even an
"average" student.
While lawyers are generally not well versed in social science
literature, 115 even a brief review shows that those who are studying

certiorari that was filed in the case. Second, in the Court's opinion in Hazelwood it
referred to the opinion as an example of substantial deference provided to school
authorities. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Third, it is realistic to presume that the
Court was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents and
expected its decision in Mergens (which also referred to Hazelwood) to be interpreted
accordingly. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979).
113. A copy of the survey is included with the district court opinion reported in
Trachtman v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198, 205-207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Not only was the
school district required to allow distribution of the survey, but in the words of the
appellate court reviewing the decision, the lower court "ordered [the district] to take
steps to oversee the distribution of the questionnaire and provide counseling for those
students who were disturbed by it; in effect, defendants were told to expend time and
money to provide 'safeguards' for a survey they insisted could not be made safe."
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 520 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1977).
114. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.3d at 519.
115. I am indebted to Dr. A. Dean Byrd and David Robertson for their significant
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the nature and origins of homosexuality have not definitively
determined whether homosexuality is a natural variation in
human behavior or a dysfunction or a combination of both. 116
Notwithstanding this lack of consensus (other than apparent
agreement that the issue is very complex) other academic studies
begin by assuming that homosexuality is either a normal variation
or a dysfunction. 117
Despite this fundamental difference in foundational
assumptions, there is some agreement regarding youth who
experience gender confusion. Compared to teenagers with an
unquestioned heterosexual orientation, those teenagers who are
confronted with challenges feel a greater isolation from peers,
parents, and community, and exhibit a much higher incidence of
self-defeating behaviors, such as psychological dysfunction,
substance abuse, suicide, sexually transmitted diseases and
HIV. 118 Others have indicated that most school teachers and

assistance in researching relevant professional literature and aiding my presentation
of it here.
116. See, for example, William Byne, The Biological Evidence Challenged,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 50 (May 1994), Richard C. Friedman and Jennifer Downey,
Neurobiology and Sexual Orientation: Current Relationships, 5 JOURNAL OF
NEUROPSYCHIATRY 131, 149 (1993); William Wyne and Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual
Orientation:
The Biologic Theories Reappraised, 50 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 228, 236-37 (1993); Eli Colman, Louis Fooren, Michael Ross, Theories of
Gender Transpositions: A Critique and Suggestions for Further Research, 26 THE
JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH 525 (1989); John Money, Sin. Sickness. or Status?
Homosexual Gender Identity and Psychoneuroendocrinology, 1988 ANNUAL PROGRESS
IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 41 (1988). Even though in 1973 the
American Psychological Association declassified homosexuality as a mental illness,
professional disagreements over the validity of such action remain. See Toward a
Further Understanding of Homosexuality, COLLECTED PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL
AsSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, ANNUAL CONFERENCE
(1995); Marshall B. Clinard and Robert F. Meier, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR
(1992) at 320, and sources cited therein.
117. For studies assuming homosexuality is a natural variation, see, for example,
Virginia Uribe and Karen M. Harbeck, Addressing the Needs of Lesbian. Gay. and
Bisexual Youth: The Origins of Project 10 and School-based Intervention, 1991
JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 9, 13 (1992); Laura Reiter, Sexual Orientation. Sexual
Identity. and the Question of Choice, 17 CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 138 (1989).
For studies assuming homosexuality is a dysfunction, see, for example, Toward a
Further Understanding of Homosexuality, COLLECTED PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL
AsSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH AND THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, ANNUAL CONFERENCE
(1995); CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, M.D., HOMOSEXUALITY: A FREEDOM Too FAR, (1995);
John K. Milles, The Psychoanalvtic Perspective of Adolescent Homosexuality: A
Review, XXV ADOLESCENCE 912 (1990).
118. See, for example, Cleta L. Dempsey, Health and Social Issues of Gay
Lesbian. and Bisexual Adolescents, 75 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN SERVICES
160 (1994); Charles R. Fikar, Letter to the Editor, 89 PEDIATRICS 519 (1992); Gary
Remafedi, Fundamental Issues in the Care ofHomosexual Youth, 74 MEDICAL CLINICS
OF NORTH AMERICA 1169 (1990); Report of the Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide.
Volume 3: Prevention and Interventions in Youth Suicide (Alcohol, Drug Abuse and
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counselors are unprepared to deal with these exacerbated needs of
such students, that counseling and assistance can only
appropriately be done under the direction or control of a licensed
psychologist to ensure that the experience will not lead to more
conflict, challenge and confusion. 119 Furthermore, encouraging
premature resolution 120 of confused adolescent gender
orientation 121 toward a self-labeling homosexual status may lead
to a greater likelihood of attempted suicide 122 and could hinder any
later adult effort to return to or develop hetereosexuality. 123
How a local school board applies this information when
confronted with a student application for an extracurricular club
like the Alliance will to a large degree turn on whether members
view homosexual conduct as a normal variance in human behavior
or a dysfunction of biology and socialization. If homosexuality is
assumed to be an alternate lifestyle, then contributing to the "wellbeing" of those students faced with such challenges could include
support and assistance in making that transition to such a lifestyle
without regard for state laws or parents prohibiting such conduct
or the effect a premature decision may have on the adolescent's
short and long-term physical, emotional and psychological health.
If homosexuality is assumed to be a dysfunction, then for the sake
of the student's "well-being" it should not be encouraged by
allowing open access to unsupervised student promotion of the

Mental Health Administration), DHHS Pub. No. (ADM) 89-1623, Washington D.C.,
Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1989 ("Report"); Nancy D. Sanford, Providing
Sensitive Health Care to Gay and Lesbian Youth, 14 NURSE PRACTITIONER 30 (1989);
John C. Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues of Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, 1988
JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 114 (1988); Johnathan Zenilman, Sexually
Transmitted Diseases in Homosexual Adolescents, 1988 JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT
HEALTH CARE 129 (1988).
119. See for example, Joseph T. Chojnacki and Susan Gelberg, The Facilitation
of a GavJLesbian/Bisexual Support-Therapy Group by Heterosexual Counselors, 73
JOURNAL OF COUNSELING AND DEVELOPMENT 352 (1995); Arthur Lipkin, The Case for
a Gay and Lesbian Curriculum, 77 THE HIGH SCHOOL JOURNAL 95 (1994); Virginia
Uribe and Karen M. Harbeck, supra, footnote 120; Kevin Cranston, HIV Education
for Gay. Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth: Personal Risk. Personal Power. and the
Community of Conscience, 1991 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY 247 (1992); REPORT,
Vol. IV, Edward A. Wynne, Preventing Youth Suicide Through Education, at 4-171.
120. John C. Gonsiorek, Mental Health Issues by Gay and Lesbian Adolescents,
A JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 114, 120 (1988).
121. Ritch C. Savin-Williams and Richard C. Rodriguez, A Developmental,
Clinical Perspective on Lesbian, Gay Male, and Bisexual Youth, in ADOLESCENT
SEXUALITY 77, 81 (Thomas P. Gullota, Gerald R. Adams, Raymond Montemayer eds.,
1995).
122. G. Remafedi, J.A. Farrow and R.W. Desiher, Risk Factors for Attempted
Suicide in Gay and Bisexual Youth, 87 PEDIATRICS 869, 873-874 (1991).
123. JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THEORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CLINICAL
APPROACH 163 (1991).
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same; rather, such promotion should be prohibited. 124 Like the
Lincoln-Douglas debates which illustrated how one's constitutional
and public policy positions on the expansion of slavery were driven
by underlying assumptions regarding the nature of man and
morality, similarly mutually exclusive assumptions regarding the
nature ofman and morality will likewise direct one's conclusion on
this issue.
Yet, whether Utah's criminal law is based on the
perspective of "millennia of moral teaching," 125 or simply on the
reality that "[f]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators
and judges have acted on unprovable assumptions," 126 local school
boards are charged with the duty of implementing law that
promotes "morality ... and obedience to law" in all of their school
matters.
Being charged with this duty, it surely is not
unreasonable to follow an alternate view in professional literature
explaining homosexuality as the result of biological and/or social
dysfunction, whose physical expression and premature labeling
should not be encouraged. Assuming this to be so, one cannot
logically conclude that allowing student-initiated clubs to promote
homosexuality as an alternate lifestyle will contribute to the "wellbeing'' of students. When such a conclusion is based on careful and
considerate analysis, the decision to reject an application from a
student club like the Alliance is an option under both state law and
the EAA regardless of the status of other non-curricular student
clubs.
IV. CONCLUSION

Neither the EAA nor the Supreme Court interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution undermines the ability or state-mandated
duty of local school boards to encourage the teaching by example
and precept of a morally based, civic virtue in the public schools.
124. To the degree that other academic literature is correct in identifying peer
groups as requiring adherence to a fixed perspective on basic issues, if student clubs
such as the Alliance only intended to include heterosexual friends who supported the
acceptability of homosexuality as an alternate lifestyle, it is doubtful that a student
who was confused regarding his or her own sexual identity would receive anything but
the message of the acceptance of an alternate lifestyle in the Gay-Straight Student
Alliance. See, for example, W.M. Hall and R.B. Cairns, Aggressive Behavior in
Children: An Outcome of Modeling or Reciprocity?, 20 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
739-745 (1984); Robert B. Cairns, Holly J. Neckerman, Beverly D. Cairns, Social
Networks and the Shadows of Synchrony, eds. Gerald R. Adams, Raymond
Montemayor, Thomas P. Gullota, Biology of Adolescent Behavior and Development
(1989) at 275.
125. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
126. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
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Neither student speech, academic freedom, nor private conduct of
teachers that has a nexus on their ability to teach and role model
identified virtues to their students limit a school board's ability to
fulfill its legislative mandate to do so. There are different legal
perspectives regarding whether or not the effect of the EAA is to
prohibit full enforcement of Utah laws protecting freedom of
conscience, parental autonomy and family privacy when applied to
extra-curricular student clubs.
Nonetheless, a local school board could adopt the position
supported by academic literature and long standing experience,
that short and long-term adherence to the criminal code of the
state will promote the well-being of its students, and that
individual students experiencing extraordinary challenges with
gender identity should work with qualified professionals (that are
generally not within the school system). Then it would be possible
to deny recognition under the EAA to a proposed student club that
focuses on homosexuality, without having to ban all other noncurricular student clubs presently allowed.

